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Pursuant to this Court’s May 24, 2019 order (Addendum A), this brief
addresses “whether trial counsel’s failure to introduce evidence that
Defendant knew the passcode to the garage constituted objectively deficient
performance and if it did, whether Defendant was prejudiced.”

RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS
Defense counsel did not present any evidence at trial that Defendant
knew the passcode to the garage of April and her husband’s house, the house
he was charged with burglarizing. This Court granted Defendant’s motion
for a 23B remand to allow Defendant to present evidence that he told defense
counsel before trial that April had given him the passcode and that he, thus,
would not have had to break into April’s house through a back window.

On remand, the trial court found that Defendant told defense counsel
at a pretrial meeting that Defendant “knew the garage code and would not
need to go through the window.” Supp. Findings (SF) at 2; Findings (F) at 8
(both attached at Addendum B). The court also found that during the
meeting, defense counsel “was focused on trial strategy relating to the
impossibility of the Defendant being at the burglary scene—later indicating
that the garage code would not have been significant to him because it was
not part of the theory and strategy of the defense and he would not have
presented alternate theories.” SF:2. On remand, Defendant presented no
evidence other than his own testimony that the passcode actually worked on
April’s garage. F:passim; SF:passim.

ARGUMENT
Defendant cannot prove that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for not introducing
evidence that Defendant knew the passcode to April’s
garage
Because of this Court’s simultaneous briefing order, the State cannot
be sure what Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim will be related to the passcode
to April’s garage. The State thus proceeds on the assumption that Defendant’s
argument will be the same one he presented in support of his rule 23B motion.
There, Defendant argued that defense counsel was ineffective for not
presenting evidence that April had given him the passcode. Def. Memo 15.
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Defendant asserted this evidence would have established that “if indeed the
jury had believed that [he] had been in the home, which [he] had not, [he]
arguably had permission to be in the home, which conflicts with the elements
of burglary.” Def. Rule 23B Aff.;Def. Memo at 15. Defendant’s claim fails
because he cannot prove that counsel performed deficiently or a reasonable
likelihood of a different result had counsel presented the evidence.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must prove both
deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-89, 694 (1984). To prove deficient performance, he must show “that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
id. at 687-88—that “no competent attorney” would have done what his
counsel did, Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). To prove prejudice, he
must show “a reasonable probability” that but for counsel’s error, “the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Concerning deficient performance, the trial court found that defense
counsel’s trial strategy was to argue “the impossibility of the Defendant being
at the burglary scene.” SF:2;F:13. The court also found that counsel would not
have paid much attention to the passcode evidence because he “would not
have presented alternate theories,” SF:2, such as the inconsistent theory that
if Defendant was present in April’s home, his knowing the passcode meant
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he had permission to be. It is well-established that “any election between
inconsistent defenses [is] a legitimate exercise of trial strategy rather than
ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553,556 (Utah App.
1992); accord State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶34, 309 P.3d 1160.
Concerning prejudice, Defendant offered no authority establishing that
any permission April gave her lover to enter her and her husband’s home
extended beyond her death. Def. Memo at 1-17. Absent such authority, the
fact that Defendant may have been able to open April’s garage door did not
eliminate the possibility that he knew he lacked authority to enter, which
would explain why he chose a more discreet entry point. In other words,
evidence that Defendant had the passcode did not so clearly establish as
Defendant might think that he’d not have entered through a window instead.
Further, Defendant presented no evidence at his 23B hearing, other
than his own testimony, that the passcode he allegedly had actually opened
April’s garage. Thus, whether the jury believed him on that point would have
turned on its judgment of his credibility. But Defendant testified to his
innocence at trial, claiming that he was not near and never went into April’s
home on the day of the burglary. R615. If the jury had found Defendant a
credible witness, it would have acquitted him. The jury thus did not find him
a credible witness. Consequently, there is no reasonable likelihood that
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additional testimony from him—that he had the passcode—would have
altered the result of his trial. This is especially so where four people identified
him as the person at April’s home at the time of the burglary; two of them
testified they saw him, wearing the same unique hat he admitted wearing to
April’s funeral, enter April’s house through the back window; he did not
deny breaking into April’s home but rather simply hung up when the
investigating officer called him shortly after the burglary; and he never
returned the officer’s call after the officer later left him a message asking him
to call the officer back. R324,365-66,369,384,387,403,427,466-67,624.
In short, Defendant cannot show either that defense counsel was
objectively unreasonable in not presenting the passcode evidence or that he
was prejudiced by counsel’s not presenting it.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm Defendant’s conviction.
Respectfully submitted on June 6, 2019.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
/s/ Karen A. Klucznik
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
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